These are the themes of my research. Please click on the boxes to find out more.
DIVERSITY RECOGNITION
From September 2024 to August 2025, I hold a Leverhulme Research Fellowship on the topic of Diversity Recognition. I am currently writing a book about it, but in the meantime I am focussing on public/policy engagement on the topic. So more information can be found on the "For Policymakers and Others" page on Diversity and Inclusion.
Agency and morality in collective action problems
Global environmental problems (such as climate change) and issues of global justice are typical examples of large collective action problems. In my view, there is a gap between the rather abstract treatment of collective action problems in the philosophical literature, and the role and actions of diverse agents in practice.
I would like to provide more practical guidance for what agents with different types of agency can or should do in collective action problems. It should still be philosophically sound, of course, but in order to reduce the gap, I would like to start from the pragmatic heuristics and common-sense morality agents use in their daily life and test these in view of moral theory.
This focus has grown from the "duty-bearer justice" theme, and can still be categorised under this umbrella.
I would like to provide more practical guidance for what agents with different types of agency can or should do in collective action problems. It should still be philosophically sound, of course, but in order to reduce the gap, I would like to start from the pragmatic heuristics and common-sense morality agents use in their daily life and test these in view of moral theory.
This focus has grown from the "duty-bearer justice" theme, and can still be categorised under this umbrella.
Duty-bearer justice
philosophers have talked a lot about people's entitlements. However, I am also curious about people's duties and responsibilities, and how duty-bearers look at them.
philosophers have talked a lot about people's entitlements. However, I am also curious about people's duties and responsibilities, and how duty-bearers look at them.
Political theorising on global justice has given a lot of attention to people's entitlements (human rights, resources, capabilities, ...). Some people (most famously by Onora O'Neill, Henry Shue, Simon Caney, Judith Lichtenberg and others) have also reflected on the duties needed to realise these entitlements. However, I would like to set an additional step, in that I believe that the concerns and opinions of duty-bearers ought to be taken into account as well. Such concerns include the demandingness objection (a large body of literature addresses this problem in the context of consequentialism, but the demandingness of human rights has not yet been covered extensively), effectiveness of people's actions, fair distribution of the burdens (for example, in tackling poverty and climate change), and taking up the slack in collective action problems.
This topic can be divided into some sub-topics:
This topic can be divided into some sub-topics:
- An over-arching question is to what extent these concerns of duty-bearers are (i) morally justified concerns that need to be taken into account by human rights theories, rather than (ii) illegitimate excuses (used to evade one’s duties and responsibilities) that should be debunked. I have done some research on (ii) - more specifically, the problem of the motivational gap and moral disengagement in climate change (see below) - but now I want to investigate how we can distinguish between legitimate concerns and illegitimate excuses, as well as how political theory can do more to incorporate these concerns (to the extent that they are legitimate).
- Led by Joanne Swaffield and Derek Bell, we are currently doing empirical research with respect to the real-world circumstances and concerns of duty-bearers, in order to inform the ethical perspective on the duties of individuals and households in climate change mitigation. A first paper on this has recently been published:
- Climate ethics with an ethnographic sensibility (Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 2019)
- I have also written (in collaboration with Bell and Swaffield) on the harm principle. Contemporary problems (such as climate change, sweatshop labour, persisting poverty, ...) seem to be distinct and unprecedented problems that cannot straightforwardly be captured by applying the classical harm principle. Our argument is that this is not entirely correct. Rather, we can draw lessons from humanity's failures and successes in dealing with harms in the past (for example, slavery was similarly a large-scale problem with many agents involved, but humanity was (more or less) successful in abolishing it). The next step will be to see how the harm principle can be extended to such global problems and how we could devise a balancing principle to ensure that the harm principle does not become overly demanding on duty-bearers. A first paper on this has recently been published:
- How new are New Harms really? Climate change, historical reasoning and social change (Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 2019)
- At the basis of this entire research topic is the question regarding the authority and role morality plays. The demandingness objection remains a significant issue in this context. However, first, discussion in moral philosophy has focussed mainly on the demandingness of consequentialism as such. I would like to analyse the demandingness of protecting human rights as well. Second, the response to the objection that a moral theory is too demanding has all too often been that "morality demands what it demands. If people can't live up to it, then this just means that we are bad moral agents." I believe that this response is reductive. People do have concerns regarding their own lives, projects, and the people they hold dear. Sometimes, it has been said that this issue can be solved by distinguishing between the public and private sphere, or by including only certain people in the community to which we apply moral edicts, or by excluding some actions from moral evaluation (such as consumption in capitalism). However, these attempts to limit morality are unconvincing and arbitrary. So my question is: How can we make sure that morality leaves room for people to carve out their own lives without becoming limited.
Moral disengagement and the motivational gap in climate change
Although climate change is a serious and urgent problem, the response to it has been far from effective on all levels. An important element in the explanation of this motivational gap is moral disengagement: people try to downplay their responsibilities, blame others, ... in order to avoid responsibility for their contribution to the problem.
Although climate change is a serious and urgent problem, the response to it has been far from effective on all levels. An important element in the explanation of this motivational gap is moral disengagement: people try to downplay their responsibilities, blame others, ... in order to avoid responsibility for their contribution to the problem.
If climate change represents a severe threat to humankind, why then is response to it characterised by inaction or inadequate action at all levels? There are two prominent explanations for this motivational gap in the climate ethics literature. The first maintains that our conventional moral judgement system is not well equipped to identify a complex problem such as climate change as an important moral problem. The second explanation refers to people’s reluctance to change their behaviour and the temptation to shirk responsibility. I believe that these explanations are not mutually exclusive, but that they still miss something to fully explain the motivational gap. This is where the moral psychology of moral disengagement comes in. Normally, people behave in line with their moral standards, because that gives them satisfaction, while they refrain from violating these standards because it will bring self-condemnation. However, mechanisms of moral disengagement allow such self-regulative reactions to be disengaged from reprehensible conduct. For example, in climate change, people try to downplay or minimise the effects of their greenhouse gas emissions in order to escape the fact that they are contributing to the problem, and to avoid having to take responsibility for it.
In collaboration with Lisa Diependaele, Andries De Smet and Sigrid Sterckx, I have described and illustrated this phenomenon in climate change, and argued that it is an important factor in explaining the motivational gap. We also made some suggestions as to how to address the issue of moral disengagement, for example through making climate change more salient for emitters and affirming their self-efficacy (the fact that they can contribute to abating climate change's effects - this contribution might be very small, it is real and therefore relevant!). Emitters can also try to reconsider their motives: materialism has a negative impact on wellbeing, while social activities and cultural and political participation increase wellbeing). Finally, we believe that more awareness about moral disengagement and education about moral psychology is needed to tackle moral disengagement head-on.
We published these conclusions mainly in the following publications:
I think I have concluded the research on moral disengagement in climate change as such, but it feeds into my research on duty-bearer justice and practical agency and morality in collective action problems (see above), because an important remaining question is how we can adjudicate between legitimate concerns of duty-bearers, and illegitimate excuses (which amount to moral disengagement). I believe that while our theorising about justice should adequately incorporate the former, we should also make sure to address and/or tackle the latter.
In collaboration with Lisa Diependaele, Andries De Smet and Sigrid Sterckx, I have described and illustrated this phenomenon in climate change, and argued that it is an important factor in explaining the motivational gap. We also made some suggestions as to how to address the issue of moral disengagement, for example through making climate change more salient for emitters and affirming their self-efficacy (the fact that they can contribute to abating climate change's effects - this contribution might be very small, it is real and therefore relevant!). Emitters can also try to reconsider their motives: materialism has a negative impact on wellbeing, while social activities and cultural and political participation increase wellbeing). Finally, we believe that more awareness about moral disengagement and education about moral psychology is needed to tackle moral disengagement head-on.
We published these conclusions mainly in the following publications:
- Moral disengagement and the motivational gap in climate change (Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2019)
- The delegated authority model misused as a strategy of disengagement in the case of climate change (Ethics & Global Politics, 2016)
- Climate change and individual responsibility. Agency, moral disengagement and the motivational gap (Palgrave MacMillan, 2015)
I think I have concluded the research on moral disengagement in climate change as such, but it feeds into my research on duty-bearer justice and practical agency and morality in collective action problems (see above), because an important remaining question is how we can adjudicate between legitimate concerns of duty-bearers, and illegitimate excuses (which amount to moral disengagement). I believe that while our theorising about justice should adequately incorporate the former, we should also make sure to address and/or tackle the latter.
The capabilities approach and environmental sustainability
The capabilities approach is an influential approach to global justice, but it has not given adequate consideration to the requirements of environmental sustainability. I have tried to fill this gap.
The capabilities approach is an influential approach to global justice, but it has not given adequate consideration to the requirements of environmental sustainability. I have tried to fill this gap.
The Capabilities Approach focusses on expanding people's freedoms to be and to do. However, the starting point of my PhD study was that the capabilities approach had not yet given adequate consideration to the requirements of environmental sustainability. Since people's lives and freedoms rely on at least adequate environmental preconditions, sustainable human development should also include constraining human activities in order to prevent losses in the well-being of currently living and future people who are vulnerable to the effects of environmental degradation (especially climate change, but also chemical pollution, biodiversity loss, air pollution, ...). Therefore, in collaboration with Jo Dirix and Sigrid Sterckx, I have advocated constraining people's combinations of functionings derived from their capabilities in terms of greenhouse gas emissions (and broader, the usage of environmental resources).
This research has been reported in the following articles (please navigate to "Publications" for more details):
Although I believe that I have concluded this research, it contained some very preliminary ideas on sufficientarianism, which I am currently trying to develop (see above).
This research has been reported in the following articles (please navigate to "Publications" for more details):
- The capabilities approach and environmental sustainability: The case for functioning constraints (2015)
- Towards an integration of the ecological space paradigm and the capabilities approach (2015)
- Putting sustainability into sustainable human development (2013)
Although I believe that I have concluded this research, it contained some very preliminary ideas on sufficientarianism, which I am currently trying to develop (see above).
Climate governance and emissions trading ethics
THis research is on some ethical perspectives on climate governance, and the economic instruments for mitigation (such as emissions trading)
THis research is on some ethical perspectives on climate governance, and the economic instruments for mitigation (such as emissions trading)
We have done some research on climate governance, and in particular on the ethics of economic instruments for climate change mitigation, such as the European Emissions Trading System and the Clean Development Mechanism. We have evaluated emissions trading in general from an ethical perspective, and argued that some of the main objections against it can be pre-empted if the emissions trading system is well-designed and appropriate regulatory measures are in place. We also evaluated the European Union Trading System according to two justice-based criteria (i.e. effectiveness and the distribution of the duties involved in climate change abatement), and concluded that the system, in its current form, lacks fairness on both criteria. Finally, we have proposed some policy reforms, which are necessary in order to ensure that the Clean Development Mechanism - a flexibility mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol - delivers benefits to the poorest communities (which is one of its purported goals).
Jo Dirix has been the lead on this research, and together with others, we published the following articles on this topic (please navigate to "Publications" for more details):
This research has been concluded, but I have a residual interest in this area, specifically related to the ethics of voluntary carbon offsetting. The debate on this topic has been polarised: some people believe that it is the goose with the golden eggs for individuals who want to contribute to climate change mitigation without having to change their way of life, while others hold that it is a wolf in sheep's clothing (to stick with the animal imagery). Critics have not hidden their contempt, by calling it "carbon colonialism" and by comparing offsetting to "buying indulgences." I take a position somewhere in the middle and argue that well-meaning people could legitimately discharge (some of) their climate duties by offsetting if (and only if) some criteria are met. I am currently elaborating these criteria in a paper provisionally titled Legitimacy criteria for private, voluntary offsetting. I think I should be more creative with the title, but in each case, the aim is to submit the paper to Utilitas by the end of June.
Jo Dirix has been the lead on this research, and together with others, we published the following articles on this topic (please navigate to "Publications" for more details):
- Emissions trading ethics (2016)
- Is the Clean Development Mechanism delivering benefits to the poorest communities in the developing world? A critical evaluation and proposals for reforms (2015)
- Is the EU ETS a just climate policy? (2015)
- Strengthening bottom-up and top-down climate governance (2013)
This research has been concluded, but I have a residual interest in this area, specifically related to the ethics of voluntary carbon offsetting. The debate on this topic has been polarised: some people believe that it is the goose with the golden eggs for individuals who want to contribute to climate change mitigation without having to change their way of life, while others hold that it is a wolf in sheep's clothing (to stick with the animal imagery). Critics have not hidden their contempt, by calling it "carbon colonialism" and by comparing offsetting to "buying indulgences." I take a position somewhere in the middle and argue that well-meaning people could legitimately discharge (some of) their climate duties by offsetting if (and only if) some criteria are met. I am currently elaborating these criteria in a paper provisionally titled Legitimacy criteria for private, voluntary offsetting. I think I should be more creative with the title, but in each case, the aim is to submit the paper to Utilitas by the end of June.
